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RECENT DECISIONS
tarily. Recognition or organization picketing could be handled as it is
under the National Labor Relations Act, with limitations similar to
those under section 8(b) (7). This would require state legislative action;
however, it would appear to be a worthwhile starting point from which
to gain a workable basis for economic improvement as a group.
Without such a foundation it would seem that any teacher picketing
could be closely scrutinized by the courts. This is so because of the very
nature of their employment, which many courts view as partaking in a
share of the state's sovereignty. If one stops to consider the awesome
responsibility a teacher has in educating the youth of a given state, this
idea is not at all difficult to accept. Traditionally a higher set of stand-
ards and a higher degree of care has been demanded of teachers. Their
professional responsibilities have never been looked upon lightly by the
courts,
The very fact that teachers choose to use such a mode to air their
grievances could well lead to a generally unfavorable reaction in their
community. Their profession could to a certain degree fall in disrepute
in the eyes of parents and local officials. This feeling might well be im-
parted to the young people whose pliable minds the teacher hopes to
educate. Also the very fact that these young people see their teachers
using this means to air their grievances could lead to an immediate
lowering of esteem by the pupils. The gravest result of such an exper-
ience upon immature minds could be a break-down of authority in the
classroom.
This seems to be clearly a possibility. If such a result did occur it
seems to this author that a state court would find little difficulty in find-
ing that in the balance between free speech and harmful effects, this
action posed a ". . . clear danger of substantive evils . .. 29 and would
thus prohibit it.
Upon final analysis, teachers who choose such a method to put their
case before the public may be using a means which is fraught with
danger. While the courts have often recognized their plight, they and
the public in general have frowned upon such activity by professional
people. In a profession which commands and requires dignity to ac-
complish its ultimate end there is little justification for such activity
when there is a legislative avenue open and a federal pattern already
laid out. MICHAEL B. RIcx
Wills: Made Pursuant to a Contract: When Parties Bound: It
is not unusual to find a joint and mutual will' or separate mutual wills
used when two persons, each owning property individually, desire a
common disposition of their property and agree on such a plan.
29 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
' ATKINSON, WILLs §49 (1953).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court was presented with wills of this
type in Pederson v. First National Bank of Superior.2 The testator
and testatrix, husband and wife and childless, each had living blood
relatives on their respective sides. In 1956, they had separate wills
drawn which were mutual, reciprocal, and identical in that they be-
queathed all of the property of each to the surviving spouse and
provided, in the event of the predecease of the other spouse, that the
residue would go to an identical group of beneficiaries. These wills
were drawn pursuant to a written contract which purported to limit
the rights of the parties to alter the mutual wills without mutual con-
-sent. The contract was executed at the same time the wills were drawn
and was subsequently lost.
In 1957, by mutual consent, new mutual and reciprocal wills
were drawn. The provisions made in the two sets of wills were
practically the same and, with only minor exceptions, the dispositive
scheme of the 1956 wills was continued and preserved. Upon the
testator's death in 1958, his will was filed with the probate court but
was not admitted to probate, as all the property which was owned by
the decedent and his surviving spouse was held in joint tenancy.
Subsequently, the testatrix drew at least two more wills, and her last
will, drawn in 1961, was admitted to probate at her death. This will
was substantially different from the wills she had drawn in 1956
and 1957, in that all of the blood relatives of her deceased spouse
were eliminated.
The plaintiffs in the principal case were beneficiaries under the
1957 will of the testatrix who were excluded from the 1961 will which
was admitted to probate. They alleged that the 1957 will was executed
pursuant to a contract, and asked that the contract be specifically
enforced. Plaintiffs demanded that the terms of the 1957 will be.
substituted for the will admitted to probate.
The trial court, in holding for the defendants, accepted the testi-
mony of the decedent's attorney and banker as establishing the
existence of a contract, and that the 1956 wills were drawn pursuant
to the contract. However, the court, as a matter of law, held that the
testimony offered was not sufficient to prove the reaffirmation of the
contract as to the 1957 wills, nor to establish the terms of the lost
agreement 3 which, by the mutual act of each party in drafting new
wills, had been revoked.
The supreme court, in reversing the decision, agreed with the
lower court as to the degree of proof necessary but held that the
231 Wis.2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966).
3 Here the trial court relied on Bohnert v. Radke, 189 Wis. 203, 206, 207 N.W.
284, 285 (1926) ; and also Heath v. Cuppel, 163 Wis. 62, 67, 157 N.W. 527, 529(1916). See also 54 C.J.S. Lost Instruments §13e (1948).
[Vol. 50
RECENT DECISIONS
evidence was sufficient to establish the contents of the lost agreement.4
The court went on to state, in effect, that if reaffirmation was necessary,
reaffirmation was amply supported by the statements of the testator in
the presence of his wife and their attorney at the time the 1957 wills
were drafted.5 The court, however, concluded that reaffirmation was
not necessary. 6
Section 238.19 of the Wisconsin Statutes7 was used by the trial
court as a second reason for denying the plaintiff's claim. The supreme
court answered this conclusion as it had in the previous case of
Estate of Rogers,! where the court specifically held that this statute does
not apply when recovery is sought, as in the instant matter, under the
contract and not under the will. When a separate contract is the
vehicle used in the action, rather than a will, the statute can be suc-
cessfully avoided.
In Estate of Hoeppner,9 decided a few weeks after the principal
case, the Wisconsin statute again came into discussion. In that case,
the supreme court stated that a joint and mutual will executed by a
husband and wife gave rise to the conclusive inference that the will
was executed pursuant to a contract. Justice Gordon, while concurring
in the majority decision, stated that such an inference would, under
the present thinking, bind a young signer of a joint will to leave all
of his or her property exactly as required under the joint will regard-
less of any change that may take place during the life of the 'survivor,
such as remarriage.10 The Justice said:
The vicissitudes of life are such that it would seem more sensible
to me that we ought not to presume such an intent unless the
parties clearly declare it."'
The repeal of the so-called joint will exception to 238.19 which
permitted the inference found in the Hoeppner case was discussed in
Justice Gordon's concluding remarks:
The policy followed in the instant decision can, of course, be
remolded by the legislature. If our reluctant adherence to a
dubious rule is deemed misguided, corrective legislation should
4Pederson v. First National Bank, 31 Wis.2d 648, 652, 143 N.W2d 425, 427
(1966). The supreme court also cited Estate of McLean, 219 Wis. 222, 227,
262 N.W. 707, 709 (1935).
5 31 Wis.2d 648, 654, 143 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1966).
6 See also, 94 C.J.S. Wills §117a (1956).
7 WIs. STAT. §238.19 (1956) : "No will shall be construed as contractual unless
such fact affirmatively appears in express language on the face of the in-
strument. This section shall not apply to joint wills which exist as a single
document."
8 30 Wis.2d 284, 140 N.W2d 273 (1966).
932 Wis.2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966).




be undertaken. For example, a reversal of policy could be in-
dicated by a repeal of the last sentence of 238.19, Stats.12
However, since the holding in the Rogers case, it is obvious that any
attorney, having a will or wills coupled with a contract, would bring
the action on the contract and thereby avoid the statute. If the desire
of the legislature in passing the statute was to require any contractual
agreement to be at least referred to in the will or wills, it appears that
new legislation to that effect is necessary. 3
When a will and contract are joined in the same transaction, it must
always be remembered that it is the contract and not the will that is
or may become irrevocable. 14 A will is, as a testamentary instrument,
ambulatory and revocable throughout the lifetime of the maker. It is
the contract and its effectiveness as a binding instrument that has
caused the confusion present in the courts. Many jurisdictions permit
revocation of the contract upon proper notice to the other living party.' 5
When this is permitted, one of two principal theories is used to justify
the procedure. The first, and least common theory, is that the transac-
tion consists of nothing more than two unilateral offers. Until one party
or the other has performed by leaving a will based on the agreement,
the offer is revocable. 16 The second theory, and the one most commonly
relied upon by the courts, is that a bilateral contract has been formed
upon execution of the will or wills. The execution of one will is
consideration for the execution of the other.17 Courts using this theory
permit revocation upon proper notice, upon the principle that a person
should be free until death to dispose of his property as he sees fit.
The courts reason that one should not be denied this right by an inter
vivos contract, the consideration being only the other's promise, with
no real value having been transferred. It is doubtful that any contract
12 d. at 349-350, 145 N.W.2d at 760.
During the publication of this article, legislation was proposed which, if en-
acted, would clarify the nature of §238.19 and also remove any inference thatjoint wills are made pursuant to a contract not to revoke. Assembly Bill 280,
among other things, would repeal §238.19 and replace it with the following
statute:
§853.13 WHEN WILL IS CONTRACTUAL. (1) A contract not to
revoke a will can be established only by: (a) provisions of the will it-
self sufficiently stating the contract; (b) an express reference in the
will to such a contract and evidence proving the terms of the contract;
or (c) if the will makes no reference to a contract, clear and convincing
evidence apart from the will.(2) This section applies to a joint will (except if one of the testators
has died prior to July 1, 1968) as well as to any other will; there is no
presumption that the testators of such a joint will have contracted not
to revoke it.
14 Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924).
15 Cases cited in ATKINSON, WILLS §49 (1953), 4 PAGE, WILLS §1708 (lifetime ed.
1950), 97 C.J.S. Wills §1367 (1957).
16 Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 Pac. 927 (1925).
17 Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924). See also Eagleton, Joint
and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise as a Means of Conveyanc'ng,
15 CORN. L.Q. 358 (1930).
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theory would justify the finding that a contract, not illusory, can be
revoked unilaterally upon proper notice. No cases have been found in
Wisconsin that specifically raise the problem of revocation upon proper
notice. However, our court has gaid:
When two testators enter into a contract to make a joint will,
or two mutual and reciprocal wills, they undoubtedly intend such
contract to be effectual, which it would not be if either party
had the right to revoke or modify the contractural testamentary
disposition without the consent of the other.'
Thus, it is doubtful that such notice would be deemed sufficient to
revoke an express contract to make mutual wills in Wisconsin.
The problem just considered does not arise when one of the parties
to the agreement has died and left a will in accordance with the terms
of the agreement. The supreme court, while stating that one party
cannot revoke after the other dies leaving a will in accordance with
the agreement, has always supplemented this idea with the so-called
"acceptance of benefits"'19 theory. Wisconsin has expressed this doctrine
in a number of cases, as in Schwartz v. Schwartz:
It is the duty of equity to grant such relief where, as here, the
survivor of the two testators to a joint will or to two mutually
reciprocal wills, has directly benefited from the will of the first
of such two testators to die by receiving property thereunder to
which such survivor would not otherwise have been entitled. 20
(Emphasis added.)
In both the principal case and Hoeppner, no property was taken
by the survivor under the will of the first to die, but rather as surviving
joint tenant. The court said in Hoeppner, while reaffirming the Schwartz
case, that the benefit received by the survivor was the "benefit of the
bargain." He received that which he bargained for when the other
party died, leaving a will in effect that met the requirements of the
agreement. There was, therefore, no added requirement that property
actually be received under the will. With the exception of meeting one
of the respondent's arguments in the Hoeppner case, it does not appear
that it was necessary for the court to discuss the acceptance of benefits
theory. This theory is used mainly when wills are executed pursuant
to an oral contract to will real estate, and it is subsequently alleged
that such an oral contract is void under the Statute of Frauds. The
application of the theory would remove the contract from the Statute.
However, the important point in cases of oral contracts to make wills
is that the contract itself does not pass the real estate, but only requires
the making of wills according to a specific plan. The real estate passes
1 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 273 Wis. 404, 410, 78 N.W.2d 912, 915 (1956).
'9 Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924) ; Schwartz v. Schwartz,
273 Wis. 404, 78 N.W.2d 912 (1956) ; Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W.
831 (1929).20 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 273 Wis. 404, 409, 78 N.W2d 912, 915 (1956).
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under the will, and section 240.07 of the Wisconsin Statutes21 speci-
fically exempts wills from the Statute of Frauds. The court answered
the problems of oral contracts to will real estate in yet another manner
when, with reference to Estate of Rogers, it said:
We have recognized that, under those circumstances, equity will
not permit the statute to be used to work a fraud where there
has been such a change in position of the parties that enforcement
of the Statute of Frauds would result in injustice and hardship.2
In the principal case, as well as in Hoeppner, the court stated that the
contract became effective and irrevocable, except by mutual consent,
when wills were made pursuant to it. The Iowa court, in Steward v.
Todd, came to a similar conclusion:
Inasmuch as their original contract rested on the mutual promise
of the contracting parties, carried out and recognized by the
making of reciprocal wills, it cannot be rescinded except by the
consent of both. As it takes the mutual consent of both to make
a contract, so it takes the mutual consent of both to rescind or
destroy the contract.23
It is interesting to note that the contract found by inference in the
Hoeppner case was given wording exactly the same as the expressed
contract in the Pederson case. The court said:
The contract that under these circumstances we find by inference
is precisely like the expressed contract of the parties in Peder-
son v. First National Bank which provided, 'it is .. . agreed
. .. that these wills will not be changed unless it is mutually
agreeable to each party.' 4 (Citation omitted.)
The court, therefore, was not only willing to infer a contract to make
a joint and reciprocal will but also to infer that the contract removed
the power of the parties to revoke in the absence of mutual consent.
Since the contract became effective when the will or wills were made
pursuant to it, the court, in both cases, declared that the terms of the
last will made in accordance with the expressed or inferred contract
would be enforced in equity.
The next step in the problem of wills coupled with contracts will
be reached when the validity of a contract to make mutual wills is
21 WIS. STAT. §240.07 (1965): "Section 240.06 shall not be construed to affect
in any manner the power of a testator in the disposition of his real estate by
a last will and testament nor to prevent any trust from arising or being ex-
tinguished by implication or operation of law." Wis. STAT. §240.06 (1965)
provides: "No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands or in
any manner relating thereto shall be created, -granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared unless by act or operation of law or by deed or conveyance in
writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing."
2 In Re Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis.2d 339, 346, 145 N.W.2d 754, 758 (1966).
23 190 Iowa 283, 288, 173 N.W. 619, 622 (1919).
24 32 Wis2d 339, 344, 145 N.W.2d 754, 758 (1966).
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challenged during the life of the parties. The cases under discussion
seem to suggest that the court will find such contracts effective as long
as the parties have not mutually agreed to change the wills or contract,
and the challenging party maintains a will in accordance with the con-
tract.25 A holding of this nature will create additional problems. What
remedies would be available to the nonbreaching party? There would
be the question as to whether the breach is immediate or merely antici-
patory, and in either event how monetary damages are to be measured.
It is possible that difficulties in conferring any effective legal remedies
might induce a court to grant equitable relief by way of specific per-
formance or injunction.
Although the contract in both the principal case and Hoeppner was
considered binding and irrevocable as to the parties to it, the question
concerning the rights of the beneficiaries of the various dipositive plans
which existed from time to time still must be decided. Each pair of
testators in the cases under consideration mutually agreed to change
and did change the dispositive provisions at least once during their
joint lives, and each survivor changed the plan again after the first
party's death. Various beneficiaries were brought into the plan or
dropped out of it at various times. What rights did they have and when
did these rights become enforceable? It is settled law in Wisconsin
that unless a right to modify is expressly reserved, a contract which
creates rights in third parties cannot be altered by the parties to the
agreement without the consent of the third parties, if the change will
in any way effect the rights created for the third parties .2 However,
the contracts in the cases under consideration, as previously stated,
were contracts to make joint and mutual or separate mutual and re-
ciprocal wills and not to revoke the same without the consent of the
other party. The right to mutually change the dispositive plan was
expressly or inferentially reserved by the respective parties. Thus, the
contract conferred no rights upon any third party when made, and the
dispositive plan was subject to change or complete revocation at any
time the respective testators mutually agreed to do so. When, however,
one of the parties to the agreement died, the rights of the beneficiaries
named in the will or wills last made in accordance with the agreement
arose and became fixed. The court ended its discussion of this problem
in the Hoeppner case saying:
The rights of the claimants arise from the will of 1949 and only
become fixed and irrevocable (the rights, not the will) upon the
25 The supreme court said: "A contract to make a will or to enter into a mutually
satisfactory disposition remains in effect until the contract is discharged by
performance or is abandoned by mutual consent or rescinded by agreement."
Pederson v. First National Bank of Superior, 31 Wis2d 648, 654-55, 143
N.W.2d 425, 428 (1966), citing 94 C.J.S. Wills §117 a (1956).
26 Estate of Cochrane, 13 Wis.2d 398, 108 N.W.2d 529 (1961); Tweeddale v.
Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903).
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death of Elsie Hoeppner. It is this last mutually agreeable will
that binds the hand of Emil Hoeppner and determines the dis-
position of the estate of Emil Hoeppner in a court of equity.
2 7
The two cases discussed have shown the problems that arise when
a will or wills are made pursuant to a contract. When, and if, such
contracts are held effective during the lives of the respective testators,
additional problems will be created.
THOAIAS A. ERDMANN
Constitutional Law: Libel and Slander: Extent of Comment
About Public Official Under the First Amendment- Rosenblatt v.
Baer: On March 9, 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' holding that under the First Amend-
ment a public official may not recover damages for false and defamatory
statements about his public conduct unless he shows that the statement
was motivated by actual malice. The Times case thus ended a division
among American courts on the question of whether the immunity pro-
tecting fair comment on the conduct of public officials and the qualifi-
cation of candidates for public office should be supplemented by a
qualified privilege to make false and defamatory statements about them.2
The question of how far beyond candidates for public office the
designation "public official" went was then left for later decision. The
Court in the Times case stated it would not at that time "determine how
far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public
official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule or otherwise
to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included."'
The Times case therefore is said only to apply to debate on "public is-
sues" designed to bring about "political and social changes desired by
the people." 4
The Court made its first attempt to further define the term "public
official" in Rosenblatt v. Baer,5 in which a former supervisor of a
county-owned ski resort had recovered a $31,500 judgment from an
unpaid columnist for the Laconia (N. H.) Evening Citizen. The col-
umnist had made statements about the relatively low profits realized by
the ski area when the plaintiff was the supervisor. The main question
in the article, which could be understood to imply peculation, was,
"What happened to all the money last year and every other year ?"
2732 Wis.2d 339, 347, 145 N.W.2d 754, 759 (1966).
1376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 Note, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284 (1964). Also see Noel, Defamation of Public
Officers and Candidates 49 COL. L. REV. 875 (1949) and Veeder, Freedom of
Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1910). For the development of the
law of defamation generally, see Lewis, The Individual Members Right to
Recover for Defamation, 17 U. MIAmI L. REV. 519-525 (1963).
3 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
4 Note, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284, 288 (1964).
5 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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